Introduction
Being unaware of something is the same as being unable to conceive of it. Unawareness of the sentence φ thus implies not only the absence of belief in φ but also the absence of belief in any sentence involving φ, including tautologies such as "φ or not φ".
Allowing for unawareness in economic models of decision makes it possible to explain an array of phenomena that standard frameworks preclude. For example, suppose Donald is unaware of the possibility of a bank run and chooses to invest his money in shares in HSBC. If one were to give Donald the message, "there will or will not be a bank run on HSBC", standard Bayesian models of decision would deny any possibility of Donald changing his mind as the message is not "informative" in the sense of ruling out any state of affairs. However, given Donald's prior unawareness, the message does impact upon Donald's information (put another way, it changes his beliefs) and it therefore seems reasonable to allow Donald to revise his investment strategy in light of receiving it. The question of how unawareness may affect dynamic decision in this way has been studied by Li (2008) , Grant and Quiggin (2009) , and Karni and Viero (2009) 
Donald's unawareness of the possibility of a bank run is an example of what this paper refers to as specific unawareness: unawareness of a particular statement or event. Though no agent who was (specifically) unaware of φ could ever believe she was unaware of φ -to do so would imply initial awareness of φ -such an agent could hold beliefs about the more general possibility that there was something (nonspecific) of which she was unaware. In this paper the phenomenon of holding such beliefs is called conscious unawareness.
Conscious unawareness may have a range of interesting economic consequences. Tirole (2009) argues that if contracting parties believe they are unaware, it may be efficient for them to allow scope for renegotiation in case they become aware of more relevant facts in future (that is, it may be efficient to write incomplete contracts). Other applications are interactive: for example, Halpern and Rego (2009a) suggest that a local doctor may refer her patient to a specialist because she believes the specialist is aware of relevant things that she is not. Walker and Dietz (2011) claim that even in static single-agent settings, a decision maker's conscious unawareness may lead her to violate subjective expected utility.
Frameworks for modeling conscious unawareness should be consistent with agents satisfying reasonable introspective properties. For instance, as Dekel et al. (1998) argue, it should at least be possible that an agent who is unaware of φ does not believe she is unaware of φ. Further introspective properties are highlighted by the examples below:
Example 1: Martha is an inexperienced gambler playing a card game with her friends. On the basis of her understanding of the rules of the game, she believes that her current hand cannot be beaten. This belief (and the conception of the rules on which it is founded) is correct. However, when the time comes for her to place a bet, she decides not to gamble, reasoning that there may additional rules of which she is unaware that could cause her to lose money.
Example 2: Eunice is a social worker visiting a family she has known for several years. She interviews the family members and observes their behavior, watching for signs of anything that would be of concern to social services, and then writes a report stating her conclusions. Given her longstanding acquaintance with the family and years of professional experience, she is confident that she is aware of all of the relevant concerns and, furthermore, she has sufficient evidence to conclude that none of them apply to the family. She therefore writes that there is nothing to be worried about. This assessment later proves wrong.
While it is true that both Martha's and Eunice's choices turn out to be contrary to their interests, neither of the examples is intended to portray unreasonable or irrational beliefs or behavior.
Consider Martha's case and let r be one of the rules of the game. It is natural to suppose that the fact of Martha's awareness of r is self-evident to her and thus that she believes she is aware of r. After all, the very fact that she uses r to deduce that she has a winning hand should be enough to convince her that she is aware of it. Given this, an economist modeling a consciously unaware agent might wish to require that for any statement φ:
The agent is aware of φ ⇒ She believes she is aware of φ
By contrast, there seems to be little justification for assuming that the extent of Martha's awareness is self-evident to her. For although she can have no idea what an additional rule to the game might involve, this could also be the case if there was a rule she was unaware of. Thus, her inexperience alone gives her good grounds to suspect that there she is not fully aware. Models of conscious unawareness should therefore be consistent with:
The agent is fully aware ⇒ She believes she is fully aware
Turning to the case of Eunice, similar reasoning applies. She should not be expected to recognize the existence of problems outside her conception since, by their nature, these problems could not be self-evident. And given her close knowledge of the family, it is reasonable for her to suppose that there may be no problems of this kind. This suggests that models of conscious unawareness should satisfy:
The agent is not fully aware ⇒ She believes she is not fully aware (3) However, it turns out that (1) is inconsistent with (2) and (3) in the most straightforward types of model for conscious unawareness. To see this consider the case of Martha again. According to (1) whatever she is aware of, she believes she is aware of, and whatever she believes must be true in every state of the world she considers possible. This means that in every state she regards as possible, her level of awareness is at least as great as it is in the true state of the world. But this implies that she is fully aware in every state she considers possible, which means that she believes she is fully aware, a violation of (2).
This difficulty, which is present in Halpern and Rego (2009a) , has been recognized in the literature and several authors 1 have proposed alternative approaches that circumvent the problem. These works resolve the inconsistency by allowing the set of things the agent could be aware of to vary from state to state -thus, though Martha is aware of the same things in all states she regards as possible, it need not be that she is aware of everything there is to be aware of in all these states so it does not follow that she believes she is fully aware.
Varying the domain of "things to be aware of" across states of the world in this way allows one to reconcile (1) with (2) and (3), but the resulting state space is no longer of the kind familiar from Savage (1954) . In the latter type of state space, states stand for a complete and consistent description of reality, where notions of "completeness" and "consistency" are fixed across states. Yet if the set of "things to be aware of" differs from state to state, it must be that the consistency of the sentence "the agent is fully aware" with a given level of awareness is not fixed. Thus, it cannot be that all states use a single, "objective", criterion of consistency: those that depart from this -for instance, any state used to model Example 2 where the set of rules is greater than it really is -are described in this paper as "impossible" states of the world.
There are at least three reasons why it is desirable to model conscious unawareness using only "possible" states. The first is decision theoretic. In order to characterize a decision maker's beliefs in revealed preference terms 2 , the usual approach is to specify payoffs to different courses of action under every state and endow the decision maker with conditional preferences in every state of the world 3 . But if a state of the world is impossible, it is difficult to see how payoffs and conditional preferences under this state could ever be defined.
Second, working with a framework that includes both possible and impossible states of the world complicates any reduction from a linguistic to a set-theoretic representation of the agent's reasoning. As was shown by Dekel et al. (1998) , set-theoretic models for non-trivial specific unawareness must enrich the standard Savage framework by describing both what the agent's level of awareness is and what events she regards as possible 4 . Set-theoretic models for conscious unawareness that use impossible states (for example, Board and Chung (2009) ) need to elaborate this framework further by specifying, for each state, what degree of awareness amounts to "full" awareness.
Finally, a pragmatic but arguably more important reason for working with only possible states is that this has been the approach used in the overwhelming majority of existing economic theory. If the goal is to integrate conscious unawareness with this body of work in a manner that is accessible to non-experts, it seems sensible to avoid departures from its existing standards wherever this is feasible. This paper presents a logical structure for modeling conscious unawareness where all states are possible and where (1), (2), and (3) are nonetheless mutually consistent. It achieves this by making the agent's beliefs about whether or not she is fully aware in any state dependent on her conjecture about her level of awareness in that state rather than on a comparison between her actual awareness and the domain of "things to be aware of". The semantics of these structures works in two stages. At the first stage, "conjectured truth" is assigned to logical formulae in all states. For any formula that does not include the string "the agent is fully aware", this conjecture takes the same value as it would under conventional semantic rules, but the truth of "the agent is fully aware" may be determined freely. The second stage then assigns truth to formulae in the same way as in Fagin and Halpern (1988) , with the exception that an agent believes a formula if and only if she is aware of it and it is conjectured true in every state she considers possible. One way of interpreting this two-stage approach is as allowing the agent's beliefs about "the agent is fully aware" to be determined by some process of inductive reasoning (as in Grant and Quiggin (2009) ), whereas her other beliefs are arrived at by a process of deduction from what is true (and she is aware of) in the states she deems possible.
As well as relying only on possible states, the framework proposed here has the advantage of simplicity. Whereas other logical structures for modeling conscious unawareness use quantification over propositional variables to assign truth to the formula "the agent is fully aware", in what follows the conjectured truth of this formula is determined much like that of a primitive proposition in standard logic, while its second-stage truth follows from some straightforward consistency conditions. As a result, the logical structures presented below do not need to use explicit quantification.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the elements of the logical structures including the two-stage semantics, while Section 3 discusses various introspective axioms from elsewhere in the literature. Section 4 characterizes the structures axiomatically under a number of well known restrictions, showing that when the agent's conjecture about "the agent is fully aware" is constrained to be veracious, the structures are equivalent to those in Halpern and Rego (2009a) . Section 5 concludes with a brief review of some of the other related literature.
Two-Stage Semantics for Awareness and Belief
Consider a formal language, denoted L, for expressing the kind of reasoning that was discussed in the Introduction. L consists of a countably infinite set of primitive propositions, P , the string ∀xAx, the logical connectives ¬ and ∨, the brackets [ and ] , and the modal operators A, L, and B. The primitive propositions are a set of claims about the world that do not concern the decision maker's beliefs or awareness, such as "it will rain tomorrow" or "demand for bread will be high", and the string ∀xAx stands for the claim "the agent is fully aware".
Any member of P and ∀xAx is a formula of the language, the full set of which is denoted Φ. Φ is defined formally as the closure of P and ∀xAx under the following formation rules 5 :
The connectives ¬ and ∨ respectively stand for "not" and "or", and allow formulae expressing negation and disjunction to be constructed from the members of Φ. Thus, if φ and ψ are formulae, then so are ¬φ and [φ ∨ ψ]. The modal operators A, L, and B, read "the agent is aware of the formula", "the agent implicitly believes", and "the agent (explicitly) believes", allow one to construct statements about the agent's epistemic status (how such statements should be interpreted is discussed below). As is standard:
, and [φ ⇔ ψ] ("φ if and only if ψ") will be used as shorthand for
respectively throughout this paper, and brackets will generally be suppressed unless doing so leads to ambiguity.
A structure, D, in L, the full set of which is denoted D, is a tuple {Ω, V, P, A, X }. Ω is a state space consisting of possible worlds or states of affairs. V ∶ Ω → 2 P is a truth assignment to the primitive propositions, listing those that are true in each state, and P ∶ Ω → 2 Ω is a possibility correspondence, where P(ω) stands for the set of states that the agent considers possible when the true state is ω. A ∶ Ω → 2 P is an awareness correspondence, mapping each state to the set of propositions that the agent is aware of in that state and, finally, X ∶ Ω → {T, F } describes, for each state, the conjecture the agent has about whether he is fully aware in each state. If X (ω) = T then the agent imagines that in state ω his awareness is exhaustive (i.e. his impression of ∀xAx is that it is true in ω), while X (ω) = F means that he conjectures that ∀xAx is false in ω.
In what follows, a subformula of any formula φ is any consecutive string of characters in φ that is itself a formula of L.
p ∨Bq, Bq, p, and q are the subformulae of φ. Use Sub(φ) for the set of subformulae of any φ ∈ Φ and define the referents of φ as
is the set of primitive propositions that are subformulae of φ).
The semantics of D comprises a set of rules that assign truth to every formula in Φ in every state in Ω according to V , P, A, and X . The rules presented here are unusual in that they operate in two stages: first, there is a set that establishes what is "conjectured true" or "stage-one true" in each state; and second, there are rules for assigning "stage-two truth", or simply "truth" to the formulae. The role of sage-one truth is to determine what the agent believes and at this level the truth of the formula ∀xAx depends on the agent's conjecture rather than the extent of his awareness. Stage-two truth differs in that ∀xAx is true at this level if and only if the agent is in fact aware of all propositions. As will be shown, this divergence between the "conjectured" way in which stage-one truth is assigned to ∀xAx and the "objective" standard applied to it for stage-two truth is what allows the members of D to satisfy the various introspection properties advocated in the Introduction.
Use the operator V 1 ∶ Ω × Φ → {0, 1} to denote what formulae are stage-one true at each state of a given structure. V (ω, φ) = 1 is read "φ is stage-one true in state ω" and V (ω, φ) = 0 means φ is first-stage false at ω. The operator is defined inductively as follows:
S1, S3, and S4 are familiar from propositional calculus. S1 requires that p is stageone true in state ω if and only if it is true in that state according to V, while S3 ensures the negation of φ is stage-one true iff φ is stage-one false and S4 makes [φ ∨ ψ] stage-one true iff at least one of its disjuncts is stage-one true.
S5-S7 govern awareness and belief and operate in an analogous fashion to their equivalents in Fagin and Halpern (1988) and Halpern (2001) . S5 implies that it is stage-one true that agent is aware of φ in ω iff he is aware of all of φ's referents in ω. This is what Halpern (2001) calls "awareness generated by primitive propositions". S6 says that the agent implicitly believes φ in ω iff φ is stage-one true in every state he considers possible at ω, and S7 then identifies belief with implicit belief plus awareness. S5-S7 suggest that implicit belief can be interpreted as a component of belief rather than an epistemic property in its own right: part of believing φ is considering possible only states where φ is true, but there is no state of mind that corresponds this.
The novel part of the stage-one semantics -and the respect in which these semantics are "conjectured" -is S2. This rule states that ∀xAx is stage-one true in ω if and only if the agent's conjecture is that his awareness is comprehensive in ω. The way in which the stage-one truth of ∀xAx (and other formulae of which it is a subformula) in any given state is determined therefore differs from other formulae in that it depends on the agent's conjecture rather than features of the state itself.
Second-stage truth, which determines in which states any given formula does hold true, is assigned according to a second set of rules. Where V (ω, φ) = 1 means φ is stage-two true (or simply "true") in state ω and V (ω, φ) = 0 means φ is false at ω, these rules are as follows:
Most of the rules function in essentially the same manner as their equivalents in S1-S7. The exceptions are O2 and O7. O2 uses an "objective" criterion in place of the agent's conjecture to assign truth to the formula ∀xAx, stating simply that ∀xAx is true in ω if and only if the agent is aware of all propositions (and therefore, by O6, all formulae) in ω. O7 marks the point of contact between the first-and second-stage semantics, and implies that the agent implicitly believes φ in ω if and only if φ is stage-one true when in every state he considers possible at ω. Thus, whether or not an agent believes a formula depends on its stage-one truth in the states he regards as possible and, for those formulae in which ∀xAx appears as a subformula, this can be different from its second-stage truth.
Note that all of the states in any structure in D are "possible" in the sense outlined in the Introduction as the consistency of ∀xAx with any given level of awareness is the same in all states.
Properties of awareness
It remains to be shown what the intrinsic properties of D are, and whether its structures can be used to describe the sort of reasoning described in the Introduction. A useful concept for investigating these matters is validity. A set of formulae ∆ will be said to be valid in the structure
, and if it is valid in D, it will be described simply as being valid.
Many of the sets of formulae described in this section are presented as schemes, where a scheme is a formula, certain subformulae of which can be replaced uniformly by any other formula from a particular domain. For example, the scheme φ ∨ [ψ ∧ ¬φ] for any φ, ψ ∈ Φ contains p ∨ [q ∧ ¬p] but not p ∨ [B∀xAx ∧ ¬Lr], since φ is not uniformly replaced by any formula in the latter case. A scheme is valid in some D * ⊆ D whenever every instance of it is valid in D * .
There are certain schemes whose validity is necessary if the A and B operators are to be plausibly interpreted as representing awareness and belief across all D. Consider the following sets, where φ can be any member of Φ:
PL ¬Aφ ⇒ ¬Bφ ∧ ¬B¬Bφ; and AU ¬Aφ ⇒ ¬A¬Aφ.
PL, which stands for "plausibility" 6 , is a formal statement of the fact that whenever an agent is unaware of something, he cannot believe it and cannot believe that he does not believe it. Similarly, AU (for "awareness-unawareness introspection") expresses the fact that an agent who is unaware of φ cannot be aware that he is unaware of φ. Any structure in which either PL or AU were not valid would not be suitable for modelling belief and awareness, but it is easy to show that both are valid in D.
The validity of other sets of formulae shows what sort of awareness the structures in D can model. Take the following formulae, where once again φ and ψ can be any formulae:
A5 ABφ ⇐⇒ Aφ; and A6 ∀xAx ⇒ Ap for all p ∈ P .
A0-A5 jointly correspond to "awareness generated by primitive propositions" -Aφ iff Ap for all p ∈ Ref(φ) -which seems to be a natural form of awareness to attribute to an economic agent 7 . One way of interpreting A0-A5 is the assumption that the agent is aware of all aspects of the grammar of L (i.e. the rules for constructing formulae) but not necessarily all of the vocabulary (i.e. the propositions). A6 then formalizes the interpretation of ∀xAx as "the agent is aware of all formulae". It is straightforward to show that all of A0-A6 are valid in D and that A1 and A4 entail AU.
A further group of formulae can be regarded as conditions on the rationality of the agent under consideration. Where φ can be any member of Φ, none of the following is valid in D:
NI * ¬Bφ ∧ Aφ ⇒ B¬Bφ; and BA Aφ ⇒ BAφ. PI * (for "positive introspection") and NI * ("negative introspection") respectively state that the agent believes he believes whatever formulae he believes and that he believes he does not believe whatever formulae he does is aware of but does not believe. BA, which as (1) was endorsed in the Introduction, then says that he believes he is aware of whatever he is aware of. Considered together, the three properties amount to the agent knowing the content of his own mind: he knows the formulae he is aware of and knows whether or not he believes each of these formulae. If part of being rational is deducing what is self-evident and the content of the agent's mind is self-evident to the him, then PI, NI, and BA function as rationality conditions.
In some economic theories, rationality also commits the agent to having only true beliefs. The argument for this is that in order to hold false beliefs, an agent must misinterpret whatever evidence of the true state of the world he has at his disposal, and such an agent could not be said to deduce beliefs from evidence in a rational fashion. However, since in D the agent's beliefs concerning the formula ∀xAx are determined by a conjecture rather than true features of the states he considers possible, this veracity condition is applied only to a restricted domain. Define this domain, denoted Φ ∀− , inductively as follows:
where ψ may be any formula in Φ. Φ ∀− is the set of formulae whose stage-two truth in any state in any D ∈ D is always the same as their stage-one truth in that state. The rationality condition can now be stated as:
Finally, there are some formulae whose validity would entail the agent's having overly strong powers of cognizance. Consider the following:
P∀ ∀xAx ⇒ B∀xAx; and N∀ ¬∀xAx ⇒ B¬∀xAx.
P∀ and N∀ formalize the notion that an agent should always know whether or not he is aware of everything. As was argued in the Chapter 1, this is not a compelling property in a wide range of economic applications, so structures in which either formula is valid should be avoided when modeling such environments. Neither formula is valid in D.
Characterization results
Characterization theorems identify those formulae that are valid in a given class of structures in D. They thus show precisely what can and cannot be modeled using the structures in question. The purpose of this section is to state a characterization theorem for the whole of D, as well as for certain subsets of D in which the rationality conditions introduced above are validated. A further characterization is provided for the structures in D that correspond to those in Halpern and Rego (2009a) , and it is shown that these cannot be reconciled with the rationality conditions without entailing P∀ and N∀.
The sets of formulae that characterize various subsets of D will be presented as axiom systems. An axiom system consists of a number of foundational schemes known as axioms and a set of deductive rules, which take the form "from φ 1 , . . . , φ n conclude ψ". A proof of a formula, φ n , in an axiom system is a finite list of formulae, φ 1 , . . . , φ n , such that for each φ i in the list, either φ i is an instance of an axiom scheme, or there is a deductive rule that says φ i can be concluded from some subset of φ 1 , . . . , φ i−1 . A theorem of a system is any formula for which there exists a proof within that system, and a system characterizes some D * ⊆ D iff the set of theorems of the system is identical to the set of formulae that are valid in D * .
All of the axiom systems to be considered in this section include the following:
PC Any tautology in propositional calculus; and
where φ, ψ ∈ Φ. The tautologies of propositional calculus are those formulae that are valid in virtue of rules O3 and O4. Distribution states that if an agent implicitly believes an implication and its antecedent, he must implicitly believe its consequent. PC and K are common to all "normal" axiom systems in modal logic, where belief may be characterized using a possibility correspondence(see Hughes and Cresswell (1996) or Fagin et al. (1995) for more details).
A further axiom that is present in all the systems discussed here is equivalent to the definition of belief given in O7:
A7 Bφ ⇐⇒ Aφ ∧ Lφ for any φ ∈ Φ. Note that A7 in combination with A2 and A6 entails PL.
All axiom systems in this paper include the following set of deductive rules:
MP From φ and φ ⇒ ψ infer ψ (Modus Ponens); and N If φ can be obtained without the use of A6 infer Lφ (Necessitation).
Modus Ponens and a variant of Necessitation are common to all mainstream axiom systems in modal logic. MP allows one to perform deductive inference in proving theorems in an axiom system, while N implies that an agent can deduce any theorem obtained without the use of A6 provided he is aware of it. An unusual feature of N is the fact that it applies only to formulae that can be derived without A6, reflecting the fact that the agent's beliefs concerning ∀xAx are determined by his conjectures. As will be shown below, strengthening N to the version that is more common in the literature precludes many of the examples that were used to motivate this approach.
Finally, stronger versions of some of the rationality conditions described above will be used in the characterization results:
NI ¬Lφ ⇒ L¬Lφ; and
for any φ ∈ Φ. PI, NI, T are difficult to interpret in terms of rationality since the operator L does not represent an epistemic property in its own right. However, it should be noted that, given A7, the three conditions respectively imply PI * , NI * , and T * .
To state the main characterization result, write AB for the system comprising the axioms PC, K, and A0-7, and the deductive rules MP and N. The notation AB {X} then refers to AB supplemented with all the axioms in {X} (so, for example, AB {T,PI} = AB ∪ T ∪ PI). Let D r ⊂ D be the set of structures in which P is reflexive, D t ⊂ D be those where P is transitive, D e be those where P is Euclidean 8 , and D b be those where ω ∈ P(ω The theorem shows that the rationality conditions can be neatly characterized in terms of properties of P and A. It should be emphasized that it does not imply (for instance) that there are no structures in D ∖ D t in which PI is valid.
Now consider a new subset of D, D T , containing all those structures where
The structures in D T are those where the agent's conjecture about whether ∀xAx is true in any state is always veracious, a feature that renders the first-stage element of the semantics is redundant (that is, it implies V 1 (ω, φ) = V (ω, φ) for all ω ∈ Ω and all φ ∈ Φ). The semantics of these structures can be shown to match those described by Halpern and Rego (2009a) .
A more conventional version of the derivation rule for necessitation can be expressed as follows:
Use AB x T for the axiom system that is identical to AB x in every respect, except that N is replaced by N ′ . The following result, which parallels Theorem 1, can be proved for D T :
Theorem 2 The following hold:
iii. D The principle advantage of using the structures in D T is that it allows one to do without the two-stage semantic apparatus -there is no difference between first-and second-stage truth so one may evaluate a formula's truth in any state using the V 1 operator. However, as has been noted by Board and Chung (2007) and Sillari (2008) , the structures have the undesirable property that BA cannot hold without P∀ and BA, T, NI, PI do not hold unless N∀ does.
Proposition 1 P∀ is a theorem of AB
BA T and N∀ is a theorem of AB BA,T,NI,PI T .
Other Literature and Concluding Remarks
The logical structures defined here draw on the contributions of many other authors. Early pioneering work in this field includes Fagin and Halpern (1988) and Modica and Rustichini (1994 and 1999) , who present structures for modeling specific unawareness. Halpern (2001) shows that the latter structures are equivalent to the former when awareness is generated by primitive propositions and T, PI, and NI hold. Thijsse (1996) describes a structure for specific unawareness that assigns truth using two semantic stages, but in other respects his approach is quite different to that proposed here.
Li (2009) and Heifetz et al. (2006) give set-theoretic structures for modeling specific unawareness, the latter with multiple agents. These have been shown, respectively by Heinsalu (2011) and Heifetz et al. (2008) , to be equivalent to sub-classes of earlier logical structures of Fagin and Halpern and its multi-agent generalization in Halpern and Rego (2008) . A further interactive, set-theoretic approach is provided by Gallanis (2009).
Halpern and Rego (2009a) extend Fagin and Halpern to allow for conscious unawareness, though as noted earlier (1) is inconsistent with (2) in this framework. Board and Chung (2007) , Sillari (2008) , and Halpern and Rego (2009b) describe structures in which this inconsistency does not arise provided there are impossible states. Board and Chung (2009) render the partitional structures in Board and Chung (2007) in set-theoretic terms; Board et al. (2009) demonstrate that the subclass of these structures where all states are possible is equivalent to those of Heifetz et al. (2006) .
The contribution of this work has been to set out structures where the introspective properties proposed in this literature can be satisfied without introducing impossible states. It is, perhaps, closest in spirit to the dynamic, interactive structures of Grant and Quiggin (2009) , where agents' beliefs about the formula "the agent is fully aware" are determined by inductive reasoning, though the current framework is single-agent and static. Walker (2011b) shows how the partitional structures presented here may be translated into set-theoretic terms, using a slightly adapted version of Heifetz et al. (2006 ). Walker (2011a then gives a decision theoretic characterization of these set-theoretic structures.
A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The theorem can be rephrased as claiming that the system AB is sound and complete with respect to D, where an axiom system is sound wrt some class of structures iff all of its theorems are valid in the class and complete iff every valid formula in the class is a theorem of the system.
A.1.1 Soundness
This amounts to showing that the axioms PC, K, A0 − A7 are valid, and that applications of the deductive rules preserve validity. Some of the arguments below follow a very similar course to well known proofs in, for example, Hughes and Cresswell (1996) and Fagin et al. (1995) . I include all of the details because of the non-standard semantics involved here.
PC is valid in virtue of rules O1, O2, and O4 as usual. If K were not valid, there would be some a structure such that for state
. A6 follows directly from O2 and O5 and A7 is implied by O7. Now suppose φ and φ ⇒ ψ are valid formulae. If there were a state ω in any structure such that V (ω, ψ) = 0 then, since φ is valid, it must be that V (ω, φ ⇒ ψ) = 0, but this contradicts the fact that φ ⇒ ψ is valid. Therefore ψ is valid and MP is validity preserving.
To show that N is validity preserving, first introduce the notion of stage-one validity. A formula is stage-one valid in D whenever for every state in the state space of D, V 1 (ω, φ) = 1. It is stage-one valid in any class of models D * ⊆ D it is stage-one valid for all D ∈ D * . An axiom system is then stage-one sound wrt D * iff any theorem φ of it is stage-one valid in D * .
Definition A.1 The axiom system AB Proof: The stage-one validity of the axioms PC, K, A0-5, A7, and MP can be shown in a parallel manner to their validity, proven above.
For N, if φ is stage-one valid, then it follows immediately that for any ω in any structure,
, so Lφ is stage-one valid. Therefore N is stage-one validity preserving. ◻ By definition, the set of theorems of AB x 1 is identical to the set of theorems of AB x that can be proven without the use of A7. Suppose φ is a theorem of AB 1 , which by Lemma A.1 implies that φ is stage-one valid. Hence for every ω in any structure it must be that V (ω ′ , φ) = 1 for all ω ′ ∈ P(ω) and thus that Lφ is valid. N is therefore validity preserving.
Thus AB is valid in all of D. To complete the soundness proof for parts (ii)-(v) of the Theorem, proceed as follows:
Since this holds for all ω ′ ∈ P(ω), it follows that V (ω, LLφ) = 1.
NI is valid in D
e : Whenever V (ω, ¬Lφ) = 1 for any φ ∈ Φ and D ∈ D e , there is some
Note that for φ ∈ P or φ of the form Aψ, Lψ, Bψ where ψ is any member of Φ, the fact that O1 and O5-7 respectively parallel S1 and S5-7 ensure that (4) is satisfied by φ. Working inductively, if ψ satisfies (4), then for φ = ¬ψ, V (ω, φ) = 1 iff V (ω, ψ) = 0 and V 1 (ω, φ) = 1 iff V 1 (ω, ψ) = 0, hence φ satisfies (4). And if ψ and χ satisfy (4), where φ = [ψ ∨ χ], V (ω, φ) = 1 iff at least one of V (ω, ψ) = 1 and V (ω, χ) = 1 and V 1 (ω, φ) = 1 iff at least one of V 1 (ω, ψ) = 1 and V 1 (ω, χ) = 1, so φ satisfies (4). Thus, (4) holds for all φ ∈ Φ ∀− as required.
To show that T is valid in D r , suppose ω ∈ P(ω) and that V (ω, Lφ) = 1 for some φ ∈ Φ ∀− and ω in the state space of some D ∈ D r . This requires V 1 (ω ′ , φ) = 1 for all ω ′ ∈ P(ω) and therefore (by the reflexivity of P) that V 1 (ω, φ) = 1. By (4) it follows that V (ω, φ) = 1 and hence that T is valid in D r . Say φ is consistent with axiom system AX -φ is AX-consistent -iff ⊢ AX ¬φ and φ is consistent with Γ iff Γ ⊢ AX ¬φ. When Γ is a finite set of formulae, it is AXconsistent iff ⊢ AX ¬ ⋀ Γ, and if Γ is infinite it is AX-consistent iff every finite subset of Γ is AX-consistent. A set of formulae, Γ, is a maximal AX-consistent set iff it is consistent and for every φ ∈ Φ ∖ Γ, ⊢ AX ¬ ⋀ Γ ∪ {φ}. Fagin et al. (1995) i. For all φ ∈ Φ one of φ and ¬φ is a member of Γ;
BA is valid in
ii. [φ ∨ ψ] ∈ Γ iff at least one of φ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ;
iii. If φ and φ ⇒ ψ are in Γ, then ψ is a member of Γ; and iv. AX ⊢ φ implies φ ∈ Γ. Now define an AX-acceptable set of formulae as any Γ such that whenever Γ ⊢ AX Ap for all but finite p ∈ P , Γ ⊢ AX ∀xAx. A similar property (also called acceptability) was introduced by Halpern and Rego (2009a) , and plays the same role in their completeness proof as it does here. Lemmas A.3-A.5 parallel analogous results in Halpern and Rego.
Lemma A.3 If Γ is finite, then Γ is AB
x -acceptable for any x.
Proof: Since P is infinite, there is no finite set of formulae, Γ, that does not contain ∀xAx and that is such that Γ ⊢ AB x Ap for all but finite p ∈ P . Therefore, for finite Γ, if Γ ⊢ AB x Ap for all but finite p ∈ P , then ∀xAx ∈ Γ and thus Γ ⊢ AB x ∀xAx, so Γ is acceptable. ◻
Proof: Suppose Γ ∪ {φ} is not AB x -acceptable, so Γ ∪ {φ} ⊢ AB x Ap for all but finite p ∈ P but not Γ ∪ {φ} ⊢ AB x ∀xAx. Since Γ is AB x -acceptable, there must be an infinite number of p ∈ P such that Γ ⊢ AB x Ap and hence it can only be that Γ ∪ {φ} ⊢ AB x Ap for all but finite p ∈ P if φ = ∀xAx, but this obviously implies Γ ∪ {φ} ⊢ AB x ∀xAx, a contradiction. ◻ Lemma A.5 If Γ is AB
x -consistent and -acceptable, then there exists some maximal AB
x -consistent and -acceptable Γ ′ containing Γ.
Proof: Enumerate Φ, φ 1 , φ 2 . . . with φ 1 = ∀xAx and φ 2 = ¬∀xAx. Define ∆ 0 ∶= Γ. If ∆ 0 ⊢ ¬∀xAx, choose some p such that ∆ 0 ⊢ AB x Ap (since ∆ 0 is AB x -consistent, ∆ 0 ⊢ AB x ∀xAx and thus, as ∆ 0 is AB x -acceptable, there must exist some such p), then let ∆ 1 ∶= ∆ 0 ∪ {¬Ap}. Otherwise, let ∆ 1 ∶= ∆ 0 ∪ {∀xAx}. Note that ∆ 1 is always AB
x -consistent and -acceptable.
x -acceptable and by construction it is AB x -consistent.
Define Γ ′ = ⋃ ∆ k and note that it is maximal AB x -consistent. To prove that it is also AB x -acceptable, suppose that for every p ∈ P , Γ ⊢ AB x Ap. Since Γ ′ is AB xconsistent, this means that ∆ 1 contains no formula ¬Ap, which means that ∆ 1 does include ∀xAx. Thus Γ ′ ⊢ AB x ∀xAx and hence Γ ′ is AB x -acceptable. ◻
For each maximal AB-consistent set, Γ, define two further sets of formulae Γ T and Γ F as follows (where Z ∈ {T, F }):
Proof: Recall the definition of the set Φ ∀− :
Since ∀xAx and ¬∀xAx are each AB show that for every φ ∈ Φ, either φ or ¬φ belongs to each of them. Since Γ is maximal AB x 1 -consistent, by Lemma A.2 it must be that for any φ ∈ Φ ∀− , either φ or ¬φ belongs to Γ and hence to Γ T and Γ F . Therefore, given rules (6) and (7) above, for any φ ∈ Φ ∀− ∪ {∀xAx, ¬∀xAx}, it is true of both Γ T and Γ F that they contain one of φ or ¬φ.
Now note that Φ is simply the closure of Φ ∀− ∪ {∀xAx, ¬∀xAx} under negation and disjunction. Working inductively, if one of φ or ¬φ belongs to Γ T , then by rule (7) one of ¬φ and ¬¬φ belongs to Γ T ; and if one of φ or ¬φ plus one of ψ and ¬ψ belongs to Γ T , by rules (8) and (7) 
To obtain the result, work in two stages.
Lemma A.9 For any φ ∈ Φ and any ω in the state space of D 
Proof: For φ ∈ P , (12) 1 -inconsistent; then there would be some finite set {ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . , ψ n } ⊆ Ken(Γ i ) such that:
in which case by N, ⋀ n i=1 ψ i ⇒ ψ ∈ Ken(Γ i ) and by K, ψ ∈ Ken(Γ i ), a contradiction. Therefore Ken(Γ i ) ∪ {¬ψ} is AB To complete the proof, the arguments above can be used to show that the canonical model of the system AB x,x ′ ,...,x ′′ lies within D z,z ′ ,...,z ′′ , so AB x,x ′ ,...,x ′′ is complete with respect to D z,z ′ ,...,z ′′ . ∎
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
If D ∈ D T , then it must be that:
for any φ ∈ Φ and any ω in D's state space. (14) implies that V (ω, Lφ) = 1 iff V (ω ′ , φ) = 1 for all ω ′ ∈ P(ω). It is then easy to see that D T is essentially the same as the structures M gpp for the language L KXA described by Halpern (2001) , who proves an analogous theorem. ∎
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Given Theorem 2, it suffices to show the following: with state ω. Since P is partitional, ω ′ ∈ P(ω) implies A(ω) = A(ω ′ ). Therefore V (ω, ¬∀xAx) = 1 implies V (ω ′ , ¬∀xAx) = 1 for all ω ′ ∈ P(ω), which by (14) implies V (ω, B¬∀xAx) = 1. ◻
